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A Permissivist Ethics of Belief
What Pragmatism May Learn from Common Sense
Angélique Thébert
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I thank the two reviewers for their helpful comments.
“We cannot live or think at all without some
degree of faith.” James, The Sentiment of Rationality
“As faith in things divine is represented as the
main spring in the life of a Christian, so belief in
general is the main spring in the life of a man.”
Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
1 In a letter to Schiller, James wrote that “from the pragmatistic point of view an ode has
yet to be written to common sense.”1 James knew that pragmatism inherited some of the
concepts and methods of common sense. But he apparently did not refer to the Scottish
common sense championed by Reid. When he alludes to the “philosophy of the Scottish
school,” he underlines the lack of “prestige” of this eclectic philosophy, which is a “thing
of compromises.”2 
2 Yet Reid’s common sense philosophy and James’s pragmatism partake of the same spirit
of reconciliation. No doubt Reid would have endorsed James’s description of pragmatism.
For the latter, philosophy is not torn between science, empirical facts, scepticism and
pessimism on the one hand, religion, first principles, dogmatism and optimism on the
other hand. The challenge that pragmatism should take up is to reconcile “the scientific
loyalty to facts” with “the old confidence in human values” (P, 1, p. 20). In other words,
pragmatism must “be a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking with the more
religious demands of human beings” (P, 2, p. 69). The same may be said for common sense
philosophy: “let us remember how common the folly is, of going from one faulty extreme
into the opposite.”3 Reid pledges allegiance to the principles of experimental philosophy,
but he is also highly sensitive to our propensity to trust. Common sense and pragmatism
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both develop a kind of “mediating philosophy” which should not tear men into parts, but
should try to reconcile their different aspirations.
3 However some aspirations seem difficult to reconcile. This is the case for beliefs. On the
one hand, we consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence;
but  on  the  other  hand,  we  hold  many  beliefs  despite  the  lack  of  evidence.  Are  we
irrational? When epistemic evidence is lacking, can our beliefs be grounded on practical
reasons? If so, may we not suspect that these practical reasons miss the point, that they
do not bring us what we want, namely reasons in favour of the epistemic accuracy of our
beliefs?
4 My  contention  is  that  the  Reidian  answer,  while  compatible  with  a  pragmatist
perspective, may get some hearing from evidentialism. Reid and James share the same
suspicion towards the requirement not to believe anything beyond the evidence at hand.
In this respect, they subscribe to a kind of anti-evidentialism and, in the contemporary
debate between evidentialism and pragmatism, they take a stand for the last: when there
is  no  definitive  and  proper  evidence  that  supports  the  belief  that  p,  non  evidential
considerations may nevertheless constitute genuine reasons to believe that p.
5 For James, this is the case of empirical beliefs, but also of moral and religious beliefs. For
Reid, it concerns empirical beliefs as well as epistemic principles.4 I intend to test how far
James’s  view on  these  beliefs  is  similar  to  Reid’s  view.  James’s  strategy  against  the
scientist  may indeed be compared to  Reid’s  way with the sceptic.  At  first  sight,  the
Jamesian dilemma (for instance, either you embrace the hypothesis of God’s existence, or
you refuse it; either you accept that you will climb the mountain, or you dismiss this
possibility) is analogous to the Reidian one (either you stick to your confidence in your
faculties, or you suspend your judgment). In both cases, we must choose on insufficient
evidence. And to some extent, Reid and James offer the same type of answer: for want of
sufficient evidence, it is practically rational to hold these beliefs if they play a central role
in our lives.
6 But Reid’s strategy differs from James’s in decisive ways. James’s dilemma supposes that
we are in a position to choose. But when the reliability of our faculties is at stake, are we
really in a position to choose? Moreover, is pragmatism the inevitable consequence of the
abandonment  of  the  evidentialist  requirement?  If  some  of  Reid’s  arguments  are
pragmatist in spirit, his argumentative strategy cannot be reduced to it. Actually, Reid
subscribes to a kind of evidentialism. He does not simply leave the epistemic scene in
favour  of  a  different  (practical)  perspective.  To  put  it  metaphorically,  he  cultivates
evidentialism in an externalist garden. Finally, if Reid and James both insist on the role of
trust which is so robust that it outdoes sceptical doubts, they do not have in mind the
same kind of trust.
7 Thus Reid and James share the same anti-intellectualist approach. They subscribe to a
permissivist ethics of belief. I begin to outline this line of thought (I). Then I show that
their views are not motivated by the same conception of evidence (II) and trust (III).
 
I. What is a Permissivist Ethics of Belief?
8 At first sight, a “permissivist ethics of belief” has a contradictory ring to it. An ethics of
belief supposes there are norms for belief-formation we should strive to respect. To be
permissive in matters of beliefs seems to imply that we need do nothing for our beliefs to
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be well-grounded. They are all welcome, even though we do not hold them in virtue of
the consideration of specific norms.
9 Yet being permissive in matters of belief does not entail doxastic slackness. To make it
clear,  let’s  consider  the  evidentialist  rule:  even  if  Reid  and  James  have  serious
reservations about it, that does not sound the death knell for an ethics of belief.
 
I.1 The Evidentialist Principle
10 Basically, according to evidentialism, a belief is well-grounded if and only if it is based on
adequate evidence.5
(Evidentialism) “A belief that p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if S has
evidence that p at t.”
11 As such, evidentalism is a mere descriptive thesis. It does not prescribe any attitude to
the subject. Moreover, it does not specify what it means for a subject “to have evidence”
(does it imply that he holds that p in virtue of his consideration of the available evidence?
). Finally, it does not specify how far the belief that p must fit the evidence the subject has
for p for it to be epistemically justified.
12 To be sure, Reid and James are not reluctant to accept evidentialism. As Reid notes: “We
give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of belief. To believe without evidence
is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to
avoid.” (EIP, 2, 20, p. 228). Reid states a minimal rule: we should avoid to believe without
evidence, which does not imply that we should avoid to believe on insufficient evidence.
Later, James acknowledges that “as far as the facts will allow,” our beliefs must not be
influenced by something extraneous to the “coercive evidence.”6
13 Reid  and  James  are  not  critical  about  evidentialism per  se,  but  about  evidentialism
construed as a prescriptive thesis that should be applied anywhere at any time. This kind
of  evidentialism  is  vigorously  expressed  by  two  philosophers  they  discuss  with
circumspection: John Locke and William K. Clifford. Locke and Clifford tie evidentialism
so strongly to a deontic conception of epistemic justification, and they state it so firmly in
an absolutist language, that it is thought to be its paradigmatic form. The evidentialist
norm is cast in such a deontic and universal mould in Clifford’s The Ethics of Belief:
(Clifford’s Principle) “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence.”
14 It is morally and epistemically wrong to believe anything with a degree of firmness that is
not proportioned to the available evidence. What matters for our concerns is that the
evidentialist norm aims solely at truth. For Locke, we must obey it for the love of truth,
“for truth’s  sake,” and not for the sake of  our passions or interests.  In this  respect,
evidentialism is a species of alethism: 
(Alethism) The  only  normative  reasons  there  are  for  or  against  believing  any
proposition  are  epistemic  ones  –  i.e.  reasons  that  are  in  some way  relevant  to
getting at the truth and avoiding falsity.7
15 What counts as a reason to believe is necessarily something which connects the belief to
its truth. Any consideration related to our affections is a disturber of truth and must not
be taken into account. More specifically, we must proportion our assent according to the
evidence (Essay, IV, 15, §5, p. 579). This rule of proportionality requires that we make “as
full and exact an inquiry as [we] can make” (Essay, IV, 16, §1, p. 581). A rational belief
results from an uncompromising inquiry, during which the mind examines all sides of the
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question  and  leaves  no  evidence  unseen.  It  is  only  if  we  realise  this  preliminary
investigation, that we will have the assurance that there is no surplus of assent and that
we have done our epistemic best.
16 In order to integrate these elements, let’s distinguish the simple evidentialist thesis (which
corresponds to what I have so far labelled evidentialism) from the strong evidentialist thesis.
(Strong Evidentialism) Anyone must always, everywhere, proportion his assent to the
available evidence. It is forbidden to give one’s assent upon insufficient evidence.
 
I.2 The Non-Evidentialist Alternative
17 If evidence alone should regulate our beliefs, what should we do in case we do not possess
sufficient evidence?
18 According to strong evidentialism, we must obey the “agnostic imperative” and suspend
our assent. As James presents it:  “Follow intellectualist advice: wait for evidence; and
while waiting, do nothing.”8
19 For James, we should on the contrary give our assent. In the case of many beliefs, we
cannot wait until we have sufficient evidence in their favour, because the suspension of
our assent  amounts to rejecting them practically  (“not  to act  on one belief,  is  often
equivalent to acting as if the opposite belief were true, so inaction would not always be as
“passive” as the intellectualists assume,” SPP, p. 223). So we cannot take refuge behind
the curtain of ignorance. We have to make a decision for or against the belief. And if the
belief is practically appealing (because it is an “invaluable instrument of action,” P, 6,
p. 201-2), to decide against it would be irrational from a practical point of view.
20 According to Reid, the first option is not only irrational from a practical point of view, it
is  also psychologically impossible.  For immediate beliefs,9 we cannot but stick to the
second option. Though the sceptic scolds him (“you ought to resolve firmly to withhold
assent, and to throw off this belief of external objects, which may be all delusion,” IHM, 6,
20, p. 169), Reid is not impressed by such a recommendation: “I will never attempt to
throw it off […] because it is not in my power […] My belief is carried along by perception,
as  irresistibly  as  my  body  by  the  earth.”  (IHM,  6,  20,  p. 169).  It  is  psychologically
unrealistic to pretend that we could give our assent only after due consideration of the
evidence. Most of our beliefs are the natural products of our constitution. Moreover they
are so essential to our lives that we cannot but live according to them right now.
21 So Reid’s and James’s non-evidentialism comes to this:
(Non-Evidentialism) For some beliefs, we are allowed to believe that p, even if we lack
the support of definitive and conclusive evidence for the belief that p. 
22 Non-evidentialism allows a permissivist ethics of belief: that is to say, it allows us to hold a
belief even if we do not possess sufficient conclusive evidence. Facing a lack of epistemic
evidence,  a  strong  evidentialist  recommends  us  not  to  give  our  assent,  while  a
permissivist allows us to go on with our beliefs. For instance, you have an important date,
but while hurrying up in the street, you realise that you have lost your watch. You ask the
time to a passer-by, who – after a mere glimpse at his watch – gives you the time. In such
a situation, strong evidentialism requires you to rely on sufficient evidence for your belief
to be justified, and here it is clearly not sufficient (you don’t have the assurance that his
watch is in good working order, he may want to mislead you, etc.), as a consequence, the
strong evidentialist prudential rule requires you not to believe what he tells you. But in a
permissivist epistemology you are entitled to believe what the passer-by tells you, even if
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you have not submitted his watch to the thorough investigation of an expert or even if
you don’t have the guarantee of his trustworthiness. 
23 For an epistemic permissivist, the challenge is to show that a permissivist ethics of belief
does not amount to promoting doxastic laxity. And as it happens, it is not deprived of
epistemic norms. These norms boil down to four principles:
 
I.2.1 The Ultimate Epistemic End is to Hit the Truth
24 Reid and James both take upon trust  that  we are  so  made as  to  know truths  (“The
postulate that there is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it, we are
deliberately resolving to make” WB, p. 12 ; “the truth and fidelity of our faculty of judging
is, and must be taken for granted in every judgment,” EIP, 7, 4, p. 570). In such a climate
of confidence, the epistemic requirement is to maximise our chance to hit truths. The
strong evidentialist veto is driven by a different ultimate end: it is motivated by the fear
of being mistaken. The wish to escape error is stronger than the appetite for truth. In this
climate of suspicion, everything must be submitted to the evidentialist test, even if it
means that we miss some truths that do not pass the test.
25 As a consequence, the more weight we give to the goal of “avoiding error,” the more
sensitive  we  will  be  to  reasons  to  doubt.  We  are  also  more  likely  to  suspend  our
judgement. On the contrary, the more weight we give to the goal of “knowing the truth,”
the more liberal we will be towards how much evidence is sufficient to justify our belief
that p. We will not wait to have overwhelming evidence to consider that we are justified
in believing that p. Depending on our cognitive goals, we do not respond in the same way
to the same body of evidence: a strong evidentialist withholds a belief, while an epistemic
permissivist swallows it.10
 
I.2.2 Our Beliefs Are Innocent Until Proven Guilty
26 In a permissivist ethics of belief,  a belief is justified if nothing speaks against it.  It is
presumed epistemically innocent (that is to say: true) until it is proven guilty (until there
emerges  a  reason  to  doubt  it).  As  we  can  see,  a  permissivist  ethics  of  belief  also
recommends that we make sure that our belief that p fits the available evidence. But the
“available  evidence”  does  not  correspond  to  a  piece  of  evidence  that  definitively
establishes that p, it corresponds to a defeater for p. Depending on the doxastic policy, we
are not required to be sensitive to the same data.
27 What is more, when we subscribe to a permissivist ethics of belief, we do not refer to
obligating or coercive norms, but to permissive norms. These norms entitle us to keep
our beliefs so long as we are not aware of anything that rebut them. Reid resolutely takes
this permissive path. First principles, on which we find a universal agreement, are taken
for granted until we can show a specific reason to doubt them.
A consent of ages and nations, of the learned and vulgar, ought, at least, to have
great authority, unless we can show some prejudice,  as universal as that consent is,
which might be the cause of it. (EIP, 1, 2, p. 44, my emphasis)
28 Thus Reid appears to endorse a kind of conservatism, that leaves our doxastic set as it is.
(Conservative non-evidentialism)11 We are justified in believing that p, if we do believe
that p and if we are not aware of any defeaters for p.
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29 The no-defeater condition is decisive. It helps stifle an objection. Indeed Reid keeps on
noting that many beliefs naturally arise (“It is not in our power to judge as we will. The
judgement is carried along necessarily by the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to
us  at  the  time.”  EIP,  6,  4,  452).  Our  assent  seems  to  function  like  an  epistemic
thermometer which naturally covaries with what we take as evidence. But how can we be
epistemically responsible if we are swept along by evidence?
30 Actually, even if some beliefs do not obtain their rationality after a hard fight, we are still
required to be attentive to  the presence of  undermining evidence.  We are bound to
question our beliefs, if we face good reasons to doubt them. “When this can be shewn to
be the case” that the presupposition that human faculties are truth-tailored is erroneous,
“I acknowledge it ought to have its due weight” (EIP, 6, 4, p. 466). But as long as we are
deprived of such proof, this presupposition is prima facie justified. The absence of any
cogent reason to doubt amounts to an “epistemic pass.” On this matter, the burden of
proof is on the sceptic’s side. As Reid claims about testimony:
It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by
nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to that side of itself, when there is
nothing put into the opposite scale. (IHM, 6, 24, p. 194, my emphasis)
31 Nature has equipped our minds so that we will not have to wait for a positive and distinct
piece of evidence that our interlocutor has spoken truth to be entitled to believe him. If it
were not so, we would be in a condition of intellectual and practical paralysis. To be
allowed to believe their veracity, being unaware of a reason to doubt is sufficient. By way
of compensation, “when there is something put into the opposite scale” (in the scale of
disbelief), we have to adjust our assent. This is made easy by the fact that we are highly
sensitive to the loss of evidence: it is not “in a man’s power to believe any thing longer
than he thinks he has evidence” (EIP,  2,  20,  p. 228).  If  we realise we no longer have
evidence for a belief, we do not keep it (which does not amount to say that we cannot
believe anything unless we think we have sufficient evidence for it).
32 On the whole, the entitlement to believe in the absence of positive epistemic evidence
does not make the justification of beliefs an all-too-easy matter. A permissivist ethics of
belief commits the agent to the epistemic duty to be vigilant for the presence of potential
defeaters.  It  does  not  state  a  norm  for  belief-formation,  but  a  norm  for  belief-
relinquishment. Its function is to revise prima facie justified beliefs.
33 Some beliefs need not be based on positive evidential support to be justified. As Reid
remarks  about  first  principles:  “There’s  no  searching  of  evidence,  no  weighing  of
arguments.” (EIP, 6, 4, p. 452). These principles immediately impose on us. Although they
do not result from a specific epistemic achievement, we deserve some credit for them.
Our responsibility lies in our being open to the possibility of facing some factor which
leads us to consider anew their epistemic status.
We do not pretend that those things that are laid down as first principles may not
be examined, and that we ought not to have our ears open to what may be pleaded
against their being admitted as such. Let us deal with them, as an upright judge
does with a witness who has a fair character. He pays a regard to the testimony of
such a witness, while this character is unimpeached. But if it can be shown that he
is suborned, or that he is influenced by malice or partial favour, his testimony loses
all its credit, and is justly rejected. (EIP, I, 2, p. 46-7)
34 We find the same doxastic conservatism in James’s writings: our beliefs resist change,
they  possess  “a  kind  of  inertia”  (“in  this  matter  of  belief  we  are  all  extreme
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conservatives,” P, 2, p. 60). It does not mean that they may not be rejected in the face of
new facts. But so long as we do not have any positive reasons to disturb them, we are
allowed to preserve them.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we generally  believe “for  no reasons
worthy of the name” (WB, p. 9). To be epistemically entitled, it is sufficient that “our
thoughts and beliefs pass, so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so
long as nobody refuses them” (P, 6, p. 207). We do not possess any positive and singular
fact  in  favour  of  them,  “the  negative  fact  that nothing  contradictory  […]  comes  to
interfere” (P, 6, p. 213) is sufficient to give us the right to integrate them in our doxastic
set. The absence of any “clash and contradiction” of our beliefs with our experience and
well-entrenched beliefs amounts to an “indirect verification” (P, 6, p. 215).
 
I.2.3 The Evidentialist Requirement is not to be Applied Always, Everywhere and for
Anyone
35 The permissivist ethics of belief is pluralist, for the way we respond to epistemic evidence
is context-sensitive. What is problematic with Clifford’s injunction is that it is stated from
an abstract and transcendent point of view, without taking into account the specificity of
the context and the beliefs.
36 In  ordinary  contexts,  the  strong  evidentialist  standard  does  not  rule  our  doxastic
practices.  “No man thinks  of  asking  himself  what  reason he  has  to  believe  that  his
neighbour is a living creature.” (EIP, 6, 5, p. 483). Yet he is convinced of this. It is only in a
well-circumscribed context, in which specific reasons to doubt emerge, that we may look
for evidence to determine whether we should maintain this belief or not (let’s say, if we
evolve  among  android  creatures  like  “hubots,”  human  robots).  But  in  normal
circumstances, though we may be aware of “the weakness of the reasons [we give] for
[our] belief,” it does not “make [us] in the least doubtful” (EIP, 6, 5, p. 483).
37 If our belief does not waver, it is because it “stands upon another foundation than that of
reasoning.” Reid is sensitive to the plurality of our beliefs: we must distinguish “things
which require proof, from things which […] being self-evident, do not admit of proof”
(EIP, 1, 2, p. 41). The mistake of the strong evidentialist demand is to put all the beliefs on
the same level. On the contrary we should give a specific consideration to immediate
beliefs which are not governed by evidence in the same way as derived beliefs. The strong
evidentialist requirement is relevant for beliefs which are grounded upon reasoning, but
ineffective for immediate beliefs. It supposes that evidence gives epistemic support to
beliefs which are otherwise in bad epistemic standing. However, in the case of immediate
beliefs,  “their  evidence  is  not  demonstrative,  but  intuitive”  (EIP,  1,  2,  p. 41).  As  a
consequence, there is no separate evidence to bring out.
I seem to want that evidence which I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect
satisfaction to an inquisitive mind. (EIP, 2, 20, p. 233)
38 Reid blames the “inquisitive minds” for making us feel guilty when we do not manage to
give the so-called appropriate reasons for our beliefs. There are some beliefs which we do
not hold in virtue of the consideration of specific and conclusive evidence.12 As we will
see,  it  does not  mean they are believed without evidence.  We lack a certain type of
evidence, but we do not lack evidence altogether.
39 On his part, James underlines that in some cases we have the right to endorse beliefs even
though the evidence does not sufficiently speak for them. In such situations, the available
evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  decide  between  two  hypotheses  (let’s  say  between
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agnosticism and Christianity if you wonder whether God exists, or between believing that
“it is on the right” or “that is is on the left” if you wonder where the guesthouse is
located, while you are at a junction in a desert land). In such cases, contradictory beliefs
may be compatible with the same body of indeterminate evidence. To settle the question,
something else must step in: “our passional and volitive nature” (WB, p. 4). The evidence
is outstripped by “personal preferences,” some “good will” (SPP, p. 221-2) or what James
also calls our “faith-tendencies” (SPP, p. 224). When the strong evidentialist requirement
leaves us at a loss, our willing nature completes the evidence and enables us to decide
between one of the two horns of the dilemma.
40 So Reid and James are both sensitive to the fact that, even if some beliefs cannot play the
strong evidentialist game, we are not irrational to hold them. For such beliefs, there is no
process of “evidence searching.” As Wittgenstein says,  they “lie apart from the route
traveled by inquiry” (OC, §88).
 
I.2.4 Fallibilism
41 The fact that some propositions are off the route of inquiry does not make them eternally
immune from reasons to doubt. Propositions of common sense, though strongly held, are
defeasible. Reid and James admit that what we take as “petrified” truths (P, 2, p. 66) may
be questioned. In other words, the permissivist ethics of belief shared by common sense
and pragmatism is a fallibilist one.
42 To be sure, fallibilism is acknowledged at varying degrees. It has even been questioned
whether Reid’s epistemology is fallibilist.13 Yet, Reid is ready to admit that our system of
first  principles  may  evolve.  He  recognises  the  tentative  character  of  his  set  of  first
principles and aims at a “clear explication and enumeration of” them (IHM, 7, p. 216). It is
precisely in the course of settling controversies about them that we may discover that,
because of some extended prejudice or bias of the mind, what we took so far as a first
principle was only an honoured opinion. When we try to distinguish real first principles
from fakes, first principles are put under scrutiny and the flavour of dogmatism (which
often sticks to common sense) fades away: first principles are not taken as granted any
more, they are proposed to our understanding and they wait for our assent.
43 We then face a paradox: the enumeration of first principles is a necessary step for the
improvement of knowledge, but when we do this,  first principles do not immediately
commend  our  assent  and  lose  their  privileged  status.  Reid  admits  it  when  he
distinguishes the ordinary context, in which first principles “force assent in particular
instances,”  from the philosophical  context  in which –  while  they are “turned into a
general proposition” (EIP, 6, 5, 482, my emphasis) – they force our assent less powerfully.
This is why, in the context of a discussion with a sceptic, when they are considered as
truths to be verified, their evidence is less compelling. It is probably in such an artificial
context that there is some movement in the river-bed, some of the channels becoming
momentarily fluid. During the discussion with the sceptic, the desired stability of our
system of knowledge looks more like a moving stability. Nevertheless, we can presume
that its overall integrity is saved, as long as first principles are not challenged all at the
same time and are not expressed in general propositions all at the same time. If there is
some leeway for fallibilism in Reid’s epistemology, it is restrained, since all first principles
cannot be at the same time in the foreground, functioning as propositions to be tested, and in
the background, functioning as channels for empirical judgments.14
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44 James’s distinction between our “stock of old opinions” and “new opinions” is concordant
with the Reidian perspective.15 Our old opinions are generally left “untouched,” but new
ones may “graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter” (P,
2, p. 60). James calls these long and fondly held beliefs “beliefs of common sense.” It is as
if some thoughts were so sedimented that it would be impossible to throw them out. He
describes  them in the  fifth  lesson of  Pragmatism,  entitled “Pragmatism and Common
Sense.”  In  this  lesson,  common sense  is  associated  with  a  “stage  of  thought”  which
delivers  tried  and  tested  useful  concepts  (like  “thing,”  “minds,”  “bodies,”  “causal
influences”). These concepts have efficaciously linked parts of our experience for ages.
They constitute a kind of metaphysical instinct which has resisted changes. Like Reid’s
first  principles  of  truth,  James’s  categories  of  common  sense  may  be  cast  in  a
propositional form: “Things do exist, even when we do not see them” (P, 5, p. 181), there
is one Space “in which each thing has its position” (P, 5, p. 177), etc.
45 At first sight, the stock of beliefs of common sense can only grow. James speaks of a
“process of truth’s growth” that is “an addition that involves no alteration in the old
beliefs”  (P,  2,  p. 62).  But  although  our  beliefs  are  like  “primitive  ways  of  thinking”
(p. 169),  they are  not  infallible.  Common sense  categories  may be  modified with the
advance of science and philosophical thought. Their “consolidation” and “augustness”
are not “decisive marks of truth” (P, 5, p. 188). James’s thought seems even more attuned
with fallibilism than Reid’s: he admits a degree of slack in our system of fundamental
beliefs (“To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic,” P, 2, p. 61). If our
beliefs “pass so long as nothing challenges them,” we must be ready to let a challenger
override them (“we have to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready
tomorrow to call it falsehood,” P, 6, p. 223)
46 So, Reid’s and James’s non-evidentialism frees us from the all-too-stringent requirement
not  to  believe  anything  on  insufficient  evidence.  It  is  a  matter  of  necessity  and
rationality: if we stuck to this requirement, we could neither act nor reason. It would be
the symptom of a “lunacy” (Reid) or a “morbid mind” (James, P, 8, p. 201). But there are
still some questions to elucidate:
1. What does it mean for a subject to have sufficient evidence? Must he have a reflective
access to it? And what is the nature of this evidence (demonstrative proof, mental state,
or anything a belief is responsive to, including facts that are not in the head)?
2. Do Reid and James hold the same kind of permissivist ethics of belief? Between a rule
that  entitles  us  to  believe in the absence of  sufficient  evidence (Reid),  and one that
prompts us to believe in spite of the lack of evidence (James),  there is some leeway.
Moreover,  a rule that allows us to believe while we are not conscious of a sufficient
amount of epistemic evidence does not entail that the only remaining option is to believe
for practical reasons.
47 As we can see, to settle the debate between evidentialism and pragmatism, the appeal to
permissivism is not the end of the story. Epistemic permissivism can indeed be applied in
two different ways. It divides in two trends: a pragmatic permissivism and a common-sensist
permissivism. As a consequence, the rejection of evidentialism in favour of permissivism
does  not  automatically  commit  one  to  pragmatism (construed as  a  thesis  about  our
reasons to believe). Let’s see how they differ.
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II. Two Views on Epistemic Permissivism
48 When Reid notes that some beliefs are “guided by instinct, that is, by a natural and blind
impulse,”16 it  seems that evidence is totally absent.  Yet,  as we shall  see,  he does not
promote a crude non-evidentialism. What about James?
 
II.1 James: Practical and Epistemic Reasons
49 As previously noted, James thinks that for some beliefs, we must go ahead of evidence. In
such  cases,  the  positive  consequences  of  the  beliefs  constitute  practical  reasons  to
believe. Practical reasons are subjective reasons which have a positive impact on our
moral  and  emotional  state.  Sometimes  they  greatly  outweigh  our  epistemic  reasons
which are ludicrously weak.  So construed,  pragmatism corresponds to practical  non-
evidentialism:
(Practical non-evidentialism) Non evidential reasons can count as reasons for beliefs.
If believing that p has benefits for you, you are allowed to believe that p.
50 Practical  non-evidentialism  breaks  with  alethism:  pragmatism  has  “no  prejudices
whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof” (P, 2,
p. 79). Anything can count as a good reason to believe, as long as it enhances our life. If
we face a lack of epistemic evidence, we are not condemned to withold our assent, we are
allowed to go on with a belief… but not for no reasons at all, or simply in virtue of the
available evidence. We are allowed to hold a belief for practical reasons. For instance, I
am allowed to believe that “I will recover,” in spite of the lack of sufficient medical data
to ground my belief. I give my assent for a practical reason (my desire to see my daughter
grow up). What is more, I am conscious of this reason, at least in the sense that I notice
that the mere consideration of it has positive emotional consequences on me (it triggers
my will to act, to struggle against the disease and to conscientiously follow the medical
advice). 
51 Practical non-evidentialism does not fall into irrationalism: what prompts the belief that
p is  the  fact  that  its  mere  contemplation raises  a  “sentiment  of  rationality.”  It  is  a
sentiment of harmony and unity which triggers our active impulses. It is a “strong feeling
of ease, peace, rest” which enables us “to think with perfect fluency.”17 Rationality does
not consist in intrinsic properties of reasoning but in subjective affections. A belief is
rational if it “fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality’s whole setting” (P, 4, p. 213).
52 Though striking, we must not be misled by statements like these: “As a rule, we disbelieve
all facts and theories for which we have no use” (WB, p. 10), we must believe “what pays”
(P, 6, p. 230). James circumscribes the conditions under which we are allowed to believe
that p when the evidence is not complete. He neither licences any belief nor recognises a
right to believe ad libitum. We have the right to believe that p, we are even required to
believe that p,18 if the belief is justified from a practical point of view, that is to say if it is
a  live  hypothesis  which  triggers  our  willingness  to  act  and  gives  us  a  sentiment  of
rationality. As we can see, the belief that p is “good” for “definite, assignable reasons” (P,
2, p. 76). We are not allowed to believe what we want: our belief must still be compatible
with the body of epistemic evidence at hand; and it is only when this body of evidence is
compatible with a living, forced and momentous option, that practical reasons come in
(“Yet sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all the truths
A Permissivist Ethics of Belief
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
10
we know, and then we choose between them for subjective reasons.” P, 6, p. 217). It is
precisely on this point that pragmatism appears as a kind or sub-set of permissivism. Like
permissivism,  practical  non-evidentialism (or  pragmatism construed as  a  thesis  on  our
reasons to believe) considers that there is no unique way for a belief to be rational or
justified. They both reject uniqueness, that is to say the idea that – given one’s available
evidence – we can adopt only one rational doxastic attitude towards any proposition.19 On
the  contrary,  given  the  epistemic  available  evidence,  if  the  latter  is  not  sufficient,
someone may adopt a belief while another may not, and both be rational. Pragmatism
adds: it depends on the practical reasons you have. In any case, given the same available
evidence,  there  are  different  ways  to  hold a  rational  belief.  Evidentialism is  not  the
unique route to rationality.20
53 According to evidentialism,  this  move to the sphere of  “subjective reasons” in effect
excludes epistemic considerations from doxastic deliberation.
54 Indeed, beliefs are not examined according to the sole criterion of truth, independently of
the criterion of action. Actually, truth and action are interwoven. For James, a belief is
true if it makes us go ahead. Truth is defined in terms of potential for action. It is “an
affair of leading” (P, 6, p. 210). More precisely, to determine whether a belief is true, we
have to examine its consequences, not its ground (“Not where it comes from but what it
leads to is to decide,” WB, p. 17). A belief is true if it satisfactorily links one part of our
experience to another, if it coheres with other facts and enlarges our doxastic set. On the
contrary, evidentialists consider that “the attractiveness of a belief does not tell for or
against the truth of p” (Shah 2006: 487) and that to determine whether to believe that p,
we must only determine whether it is the case that p,  independently of the question
whether it is in our interest to believe that p. 
55 Of course, practical reasons are not totally indifferent to the norm of truth. For instance,
when I believe that p (“I will  succeed in a perilous leap”), 21 I  believe that p not only
because I consider that it will have a positive effect on me (and make me succeed my
leap), but also because I think that it is at least possible that p. My bet is far from being
truth-irrelevant. But as James makes clear, in such cases we are deprived of relevant
evidence (“Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform
it successfully,” SR, p. 96). As a consequence, we cannot determine whether p. Even if it is
plausible that p (for instance if I am not well known for my susceptibility to vertigo), it
remains the case that nothing warrants the truth of p (because I do not know anything
about my capacity to make such a jump). If epistemic reasons are not a pure nothing, they
are therefore prior but withered and insufficient evidence which must be completed by
practical and overwhelming reasons.22
56 Finally, what is presented as a fault by the intellectualist, is turned by James into a rare
quality, possessed by some lucky geniuses. Far from being the symptom of an inattentive
mind, the capacity to “outstrip scientific evidence” (SR, p. 96) may be the sign of an acute
responsiveness to evidence. Some people are able to extend a certain body of evidence.
Why shouldn’t they make use of this capacity just because of the “mental nullity” of other
men (SR, p. 93)?
But what is the use of being a genius, unless with the same scientific evidence as
other men, one can reach more truth than they? […] In short, if I am born with such
a superior general reaction to evidence that I can guess right and act accordingly, and
gain all that comes of right action, while my less gifted neighbor (paralyzed by his
scruples and waiting for more evidence which he dares not anticipate, much as he
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longs to) still stand shivering on the brink, by what law shall I be forbidden to reap
the advantages of my superior native sensitiveness? (SR, p. 92-94, my emphasis)
57 For James, believing for practical reasons is not the symptom of epistemic carelessness, it
is  often the capacity of  some well-endowed minds to see beyond the mere tentative
epistemic  evidence.  These  minds  are  so  sensitive  to evidence  that  they  are  able  to
perceive the possibilities of action it outlines. When the strong evidentialist sees dumb
evidence, the practical non-evidentialist sees a project, a future.
 
II.2 Reid: External and Internal Evidence 
58 As for James, Reid notes that practical reasons may be a substitute for epistemic reasons,
when the latter are wanting.
 
II.2.1 The Pragmatist Argument
59 When he comes to epistemic principles, Reid notes that even if we do not believe them for
specific reasons, we are allowed to take them for granted. To the insistent sceptic who
asks for a reason, Reid answers that “although the sober part of mankind will not be very
anxious to know [his] reasons,” he indulges in giving some (IHM, 6, 20, p. 169). One of
them is  that we are entitled to hold these beliefs from a practical  point of  view.  To
enlighten this point,  Reid appeals to the thought experiment of someone deprived of
these beliefs. What would have happened if, as a child, I had not believed them? And what
would happen now if I resolved to throw them off? Reid shows that it would have resulted
(or would result) in epistemic and practical disaster. These beliefs are indeed necessary to
the development of our reasoning faculties and thanks to them we gain considerable
social benefits. Had we the power to withhold them, we would be required not to do so, at
least for prudential reasons.
I think it would not be prudent to throw off this belief, if  it  were in my power. If
Nature intended to deceive me, and impose upon me by false appearances, and I, by
my great  cunning  and profound logic,  have  discovered  the imposture;  prudence
would dictate to me in this case, even to put up this indignity done me, as quietly as I
could […].  For what do I  gain by resenting this injury? You ought at least not to
believe what she says. This indeed seems reasonable, if she intends to impose upon
me. But what is the consequence? I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my
nose against a post that comes in my way; I  step into a dirty kennel;  and, after
twenty such wise and rational actions, I am taken up and clapt into a mad-house.
Now,  I  confess  I  would  rather  make  one  of  the  credulous  fools  whom  Nature
imposes  upon,  than  of  those  wise  and  rational  philosophers  who  resolve  to
withhold assent at all this expence. (IHM, 6, 20, 169-170, my emphasis)
60 So even if we discovered that Nature deceives us, it would be rational (from a practical
point  of  view)  to keep on believing.  For  we would not  gain anything by intellectual
integrity. Worse, we would lose a lot: our sanity. And the state of madness is simply not a
live hypothesis for us. The same conclusion is drawn from consideration of children’s
education. 
Were  our  belief  to  be  withheld  till  we  are  capable,  in  any  degree,  of  weighing
evidence, we should lose all the benefit of that instruction and information, without
which we could never attain the use of our rational faculties. (EAP, 3, 1, 2, p. 111)
61 It makes a significant practical difference for us to stick to our beliefs of common sense
rather than refrain from them.
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62 These considerations sound extremely pragmatic, but they are not without difficulty.
63 Firstly, it seems that we cannot qualify as “rational” for holding a belief we could not
have chosen not to accept. The pragmatist argument presupposes a “decision-theoretic”
model. For practical reasons to be efficient, we must really have the power to decide
between accepting a  belief  or  refusing it.  Yet  in what  sense could we be rational  in
believing  things  we  cannot  prevent  ourselves  from  believing?  The  Reidian  thought
experiment comes only to asking “whether it would be rational for us to stick with what
we have,  if  we  had a  choice” (Alston 1991:  168).  Its  purport  is  therefore limited.  It  is
nevertheless one of our sole argumentative resorts until we have new faculties “to sit in
judgment upon the old” (EIP, 7, 4, p. 571). 
64 As it happens, Reid moves to the pragmatist argument, because he is well aware of the
epistemic circularity involved in any attempt to give an epistemic reason for an epistemic
principle.23 Indeed, what epistemic reason could he give to someone who challenges –
let’s say – the epistemic principle of perception? If we are committed to this epistemic
principle, it determines the kind of evidence we are sensitive to. So it is no surprise that
the epistemic reason we will give to our objector for adopting it (for instance, cases of
correct perceptions) will not be recognised as valid by him: the sceptic will consider it as
stamped by the very epistemic principle he wants to be independently justified. In such
cases, we might as well give a practical reason. However, the pragmatic “way out” will not
satisfy someone asking for an epistemic justification. Practical reasons do not show how
epistemic principles are linked to truth.24 Is it not theoretically frustrating to content
ourselves with practical rationality?
65 According to Lynch, “these reasons may not be the glittering diamonds of certainty that
Descartes dreamed of by his fire, but they are reasons, and human” (2013: 359). They are
human because being a human is being an epistemic and a practical agent.
One cannot, it appears, be an epistemic agent without at the same time also being a
practical agent. At the root level, your practical and epistemic commitments cannot
be disentangled. […] if we enter epistemology through the doorway of epistemic
agency […] we find that epistemology involves norms that are intertwined with
practical norms. (Lynch 2013: 359)
66 I think that Reid has precisely seized this point. When he describes common sense, he
presents  it  as  a  degree  of  judgment  which  especially  manifests  through our  actions
(“Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can
converse and transact business,” “It is this degree of reason, and this only, that makes a
man  capable  of  managing  his  own  affairs,  and  answerable  for  his  conduct  towards
others,” EIP, 6, 2, p. 424, p. 433). Common sense is inseparably theoretical and practical, it
is what makes us deal with our fellows and the world. Being endowed with common sense
means being both an epistemic and a practical agent.  It  does not mean being a pure
intellectual mind. As a consequence, practical rationality is tied to epistemic rationality.
And since epistemic principles are the products of common sense, it is not inopportune to
mention practical reasons to justify them.25
 
II.2.2 The Evidentialist Argument 
67 Actually Reid does not put much stress on practical reasons either. As we have seen, in
normal circumstances, people are not “anxious” to know their reasons to believe. His
view is that immediate beliefs are well-grounded although they are not held for any
reason. How is it possible?
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68 As it happens, Reid opposes strong evidentialism because, as it is promoted by Locke, it is
tied to internalism. This is the universal requirement of this feature that Reid rejects. By
“internalism,” I refer here to an epistemological theory about the type of access we have
to evidence. According to it, a belief that p is justified for a subject if and only if the
evidence  for  p is  accessible  (actually  or  potentially)  from the  subject’s  perspective. 26 
Strong evidentialism presupposes this awareness requirement. The motivation for it is to
prescribe the possibility of having beliefs “we don’t know how,” beliefs which could as
well have been acquired accidentally. But Reid’s simple evidentialism is not unconditionally
tied to the awareness requirement. So if Reid is not “anxious” to spell his evidence for his
immediate beliefs, it is not that evidence is not there, it is simply because we do not have
access to it.
69 Our immediate beliefs are indeed the effects of our constitution, they come “from the
Mint of Nature” (IHM, 6, 20, p. 168-9), and we do not have access to Nature’s core. In
accordance  to  his  mysterianism,  Reid  notes  that  the  natural  principles  from  which
immediate beliefs result are not disclosed to ourselves. On this matter, we are left in an
“impenetrable  darkness.”  We  can  only  state  that  such  principles  are  “parts  of  our
constitution”  (“That  our  sensations  of  touch  indicate  something  external,  extended,
figured, hard or soft, is not a deduction of reason, but a natural principle. The belief of it,
and the very conception of it, are equally parts of our constitution,” IHM, 5, 7, p. 72). Once
this is stated, there is nothing else to say. Our immediate beliefs are grounded on our
constitution, but we do not have God’s eyes to testify that our constitution is attuned to
the world (“If we are deceived in it, we are deceived by Him that made us, and there is no
remedy,” IHM, 5, 7, p. 72).
70 However, this externalist feature does not tell  the whole story about Reid’s way with
evidence. Actually, Reid interweaves externalist considerations with internalist ones. In a
few words, he develops strands of internalism in an externalist framework. When certain
beliefs  are at  stake,  we must  have a specific  access  to their  evidence in order to be
entitled  to  hold  them.  This  is  the  case  of  beliefs  which  are  the  conclusions  of  a
demonstration.
In all reasoning, there must be one or more premises, and a conclusion drawn from
them. And the premises are called the reason why we must believe the conclusion
which we see to follow from them. That the evidence of sense is of a different kind,
needs little proof. No man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels; and if
he did, it would be difficult to find one. (EIP, 2, 20, p. 230)
71 The evidence of sense does not work in the same way as the evidence of reasoning: it
supports perceptual beliefs even if the subject is not able to specify it. Of course, in order
to believe that “the magnolia is blooming,” I have to perceive the blooming magnolia. My
belief is grounded on a sensation, and I am aware of that sensation. Yet this awareness is
not a stringent requirement: apart from mentioning the fact that “I distinctly see the
magnolia in the garden,” I can say nothing more (“This is all I can say,” EIP, 3, 2, p. 256). I
do not know how this sensation functions as evidence. I cannot explain why it induces me
to believe that “the magnolia is  blooming.” After all,  this  sensation could have been
designed so as to be the sign of something else (let’s say of a rough table). Moreover this
evidence does not testify for itself: it does not show that it proceeds from a reliable power
of mind. Now if I were being asked why I believe that what I see really exists as I see it, I
should prove that my sense perception is reliable. However, I do not apprehend this fact
of my nature independently from its outputs. Therefore a man “can give no reason for
believing his senses” (EIP,  2,  20,  p. 230).  He cannot give an independent and decisive
A Permissivist Ethics of Belief
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
14
reason for it, he does not have a reflective access to “the work of the Almighty,” a fact
that should be laid before his eyes in order to answer the sceptic’s demand.
72 Things are different when we deal with the conclusion of a demonstration: here,  the
evidence of reasoning must be “fairly laid before” the subject in the premises (EIP, 2, 20,
p. 229). To sum up, “for Reid, not all types of […] evidence work the same way. Some types
[…] require conscious awareness if they are to function as evidence for certain beliefs and
if  they are to produce the beliefs.  But  other  types of  evidence do not.”27 Thus,  in a
demonstration,  evidence  takes  the  form  of  an  argument  that  must  be  specifically
considered by an attentive mind. But evidence can also prompt the assent without being
examined in a preliminary step. This is how the evidence of sense mostly works. For
instance, if some sensory evidence must appear to us in order to be entitled to believe
that “the magnolia is blooming,” we do not have access to the proper functioning of our
constitution, and this is yet what accounts for the connection between the sensation and
the belief. Part of the belief’s ground is left hidden to us. 
73 What should be clear now is that Reid does not oppose evidentialism per se, he opposes
the strong evidentialist’s requirement to always have a reflective access to the main part
of one’s evidence. We are entitled to hold immediate beliefs, even though it is not in
virtue of the specific consideration of their main evidence. It does not preclude evidence
from being there and doing its grounding-job.
74 Reid’s common-sensism constitutes a second kind or sub-set of permissivism: according
to it, there are some beliefs (the immediate products of our consciousness, memory and
perception) which we are justified to hold even if we don’t have access to the whole body
of  epistemic  evidence  that  grounds  them.  This  insufficiency  is  not  compensated  by
invoking  explicit  practical  reasons,  but  by  instinctively  trusting  the  veracity  of  our
intellectual faculties.28
 
III. Two Views on Trust
75 Reid and James both underline that we are rational to hold some beliefs in spite of the
lack of evidence. But while James considers that evidence is wanting because such beliefs
cannot “be decided on intellectual grounds” (WB, p. 11), for Reid evidence is there but
simply not discerned. What remains to be shown is what will take over and complete the
wanting grounds (for James), or the absence of awareness of the grounds (for Reid).
 
III.1 James: Trust as a Leap of Faith
76 For James, there are some circumstances in which “our passional nature not only lawfully
may, but must, decide an option between propositions.” It is the case “whenever it is a
genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds” (WB, p. 11).
We have to do with a genuine option when we are faced with an option “of the forced,
living, and momentous kind” (p. 3): there are two hypotheses which have some appeal to
us, we cannot but choose between them, and the choice has significant consequences for
our life. This is the case with moral and religious options (like between being vegetarian
or carnivorous, agnostic or a Christian), but also with more trivial empirical beliefs (when
for instance I have to decide between someone loving me or someone not loving me).
While  we  face  such  a  tremendous  choice,  if  we  are  deprived  of  sufficient  scientific
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evidence to make a decision with full knowledge of the facts, our “passional character”
gives us the strength to bet for one hypothesis. This passional nature acts like a motive
for our will. It includes our subjective preferences and emotions and corresponds to what
James calls “faith.” Our faith gives us courage to “run ahead of scientific evidence” (p. 25)
and to bet on the hypothesis which seems to enlarge our potentialities of action. Thanks
to this “trusting spirit,” we are bold enough to “take a leap in the dark” (p. 31).
77 As we can see, this leap of faith is an affair of human temper: whereas a pessimistic
temperament  craves  for  security  and  definitive  truths,  a  confident  and  passionate
temperament dares venture in indeterminate matters, without any assurance. Better to
be endowed with such a passional nature because life in its entirety is a risky matter (“In
the total  game of  life we stake our persons all  the while,” SR,  p. 94).  Thanks to this
“precursive trust,” we dare “jump with both feet off the ground into or towards [this]
world” (SPP, p. 230) and we are hopeful that our jump will be met by the world. Faith
makes us act unhesitatingly, even when the success of the action is not warranted.
Faith  means  belief  in  something  concerning  which  doubt  is  still  theoretically
possible; […] faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is
not certified to us in advance. […] In the average man, […] the power to trust, to risk
a little beyond the literal evidence is an essential function. (SR, p. 90-1).
78 Faith compensates the lack of evidence. It is the human way to fill the evidential gap and
trump epistemic reasons. Insofar as we constantly face risky situations, faith is not a
frivolous attitude but “one of the inalienable birthrights of our mind” (SPP, p. 225). It is
the germ of our “most elevated” beliefs. For such beliefs, the will is a “complement” to
evidence: “as regards this kind of truths faith is not only licit and pertinent, but essential
and indispensable” (SR, p. 96).
 
III.2 Reid: Trust as a Natural Propensity to Take Things for Granted
79 Reid also underlines the constitutive role of faith. Yet for him, faith is not an impulsion of
the  will  to  bet  for  a  peculiar  hypothesis:  it  is  a  natural  propensity  to  take  general
principles for granted.
80 Firstly, faith is not an attitude specific to a kind of temperament: it is a universally shared
tendency inherited from infancy.  By growing up,  this extensive faith is  progressively
adjusted and corrected. 
81 Secondly, trust is “implicit” and “instinctive” (IHM, 6, 20, p. 170): it is not a conscious and
explicit commitment. We do not decide to trust, but we find ourselves trusting.
82 Thirdly,  trust sustains our most general and shared beliefs,  like the beliefs that “our
intellectual faculties are truth-oriented” or that “our parents speak truth.” It supports
necessary beliefs, not one hypothesis among others. 
83 Fourthly, when we trust the veracity of our parents or the fidelity of our intellectual
faculties, we do not make any bold step. We do not hope our faculties will be attuned to
reality. We do not muster all our courage so as to venture in risky situations. We rather
act and judge on this ground with complete peace of mind. This presupposition, held with
assurance, is not a specific belief for which we explicitly take a stand. It is the background
of our judgments and actions. Trust is not a supplementary act of the mind that gives us
the impulsion to adopt a belief instead of another. It is a default disposition which is tied
to the powers of our mind. It is a kind of primitive attitude.
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84 This animal trust is epistemic, not only because its object (the reliability of our faculties,
the veracity of men) is epistemic, or because it is a means to an epistemic end (to gain
truths), but also because it is embedded in our powers of knowledge. We cannot make use
of any intellectual power without taking its reliability for granted. This taking for granted
does not result from reasoning or patient observation. Our faith in the reliability of our
judging faculties is not a superadded propositional attitude towards our faculties: it is the
way we make use of them. We are constituted so that when we act and judge, we are
committed to such a belief. Being committed to the epistemic principle that “our sense
perception is reliable” means therefore to trust our sense perception. This is the way
human beings use their sense perception. As it were, trust is fused into the foundations of
our intellectual powers.
85 Finally, trust is not what compensates the lack of evidence. Evidence is indeed mostly
there,  but  it  is  not  discerned.  Trust  is  what  enables  us  to  think  and  act  until  our
intellectual faculties become more mature and we put a specific attention on the available
evidence. Trust makes us act and think with certainty in spite of our lack of attention to
evidence.
When we consider man as a rational creature, it may seem right that he should
have  no  belief  but  what  is  grounded  upon  evidence  […].  If  this  be  so,  the
consequence is, that, in no case, can there be any belief, till we find evidence, or at
least, what to our judgement appears to be evidence. I suspect it is not so; but that,
on the contrary, before we grow up to the full use of our rational faculties, we do
believe, and must believe many things without any evidence at all. […] If there be any
instinctive belief in man, it is probably of the same kind with that which we ascribe
to  brutes,  and  may  be  specifically  different  from  that  rational  belief  which  is
grounded on evidence ; but that there is something in man which we call belief,
which  is  not  grounded  on  evidence,  I  think,  must  be  granted.  We  need  to  be
informed of many things before we are capable of discerning the evidence on which
they rest. […] Children have every thing to learn; and, in order to learn, they must
believe their instructors. They need a greater stock of faith from infancy to twelve
or fourteen, than ever after. But how shall they get this stock so necessary to them?
If their faith depends upon evidence, the stock of evidence, real or apparent, must
bear proportion to their faith. But such, in reality, is their situation, that when their
faith must be greatest, the evidence is least. They believe a thousand things before
they ever spend a thought upon evidence. Nature supplies the want of evidence, and
gives them an instinctive kind of faith without evidence. (EAP, 3, 1, 2, p. 110-2, my
emphasis)
86 We may be quite disturbed by Reid’s statement that “we do believe, and must believe
many things without any evidence at all.” Actually he means that we do believe and must
believe without discerned evidence. We do not have a reflective access to evidence, but it
does not imply that our beliefs are not grounded on any evidence. This is what makes the
difference between instinctive beliefs and rational beliefs: they are based on the same
body of evidence, but it remains undiscerned in the first case. Instinctive beliefs make us
act and think so long as our rational faculties (our powers of attention and reasoning)
have not developed. We are irrational in this respect, but it is rational for us to believe
without waiting for the growing of our rational faculties.
87 Therefore, faith supplies the want of discerned evidence. As Reid notices, faith does not
progressively proceed from evidence, it is not gained through the collection of different
reasons to trust. It is the other way around: faith supplies the want of evidence, that is to
say the want of discerned evidence. Evidence is there, but we do not “spend a thought” on
it. That’s why our faith is the “greatest” when “the evidence is least”: when we do not
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have the power to discern evidence,  our faith is  at  its  utmost.  It  bridges the gap of
“evidence awareness.”
88 Of course, when one is aware of the evidence, faith does not disappear. On the contrary, it
gains support from the new (discerned) evidence. When we use our reason, we yield to
epistemic principles “not from instinct only, but from confidence and trust in a faithful
and  beneficent  Monitor,  grounded  upon  the  experience  of  his  paternal  care  and
goodness” (IHM, 6,  20,  p. 170).  It  is  no more an instinctive and primitive faith,  but a
conscious and reflective faith. Afterwards, we are able to give reasons to hold epistemic
principles, even if we have not held them for any reason so far.
 
Conclusion
89 Reid and James both propose a permissivist  ethics of  belief,  according to which it  is
rational to hold some beliefs on insufficient evidence. I have shown that, even though
they agree on this core point, they do not for the same reasons.
90 For James, the permissivist policy mainly concerns beliefs which are a matter of choice
and which (given the epistemic evidence) are undecidable. When the strong evidentialist
method leaves us indeterminate between two hypotheses, the “subjective method, the
method of belief based on desire” (SR, p. 97) gives us assistance and makes us choose
thanks to a leap of faith.
91 For Reid, there is no “leap” because he is concerned with immediate beliefs. With such
beliefs, we are not in a situation of epistemic indifference at all. Our assent is weighed
down with evidence, though undiscerned. As a consequence, we are not in a position to
decide to hold them for non evidential reasons, because we are simply not in a position to
choose.
92 Thanks to his subtle view on evidence, Reid is able to counter some evidentialist attacks.
Whereas James considers that we are entitled to hold a belief that p for practical reasons,
evidentialists do not recognise practical reasons as genuine reasons to believe that p is
true. This is where their profound disagreement with pragmatism lies. Although Reid’s
permissivist  ethics of  belief  integrates pragmatist aspects,  it  is  liable to convince the
evidentialist camp. Briefly, for Reid as for James, it is rational to hold some beliefs even if
we do not hold them for epistemic reasons. But, according to Reid:
93 1. It  is  not because epistemic reasons are absent:  they are there, they are simply not yet
discerned.  Reid’s  way of  construing evidence is  qualified:  by “evidence,” he does not
necessarily refer to a ground of belief we are aware of.
94 2.  Practical  reasons  do not  substitute  for  epistemic  reasons  to  believe.  Even if  we can give
practical  reasons  for  our  immediate  beliefs,  we  do  not  hold  them  for  practical
considerations. Reid does not break with alethism; and far from triggering our beliefs,
practical reasons only serve to enlighten the indispensable role of epistemic principles in
our epistemic and practical lives.
95 3. Instinctive trust substitutes for the absence of discerned evidence. Trust is not an act of the
will that gives us the impulse to accept a belief, it is a natural propensity to take some
things for granted. For James, trust is like a springboard to jump into the unknown. Its
connexion  with  our  willing  and  emotional  nature  is  obviously  what  frightens
evidentialists. For Reid, trust is not a subjective component of the mind, it belongs to the
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human constitution. What lies at the bottom of our doxastic practices are not particularly
heroic and courageous actions. Instinctive trust is an implicit attitude which impregnates
our behaviour and mental atmosphere so much that the possibility of other alternatives
does not occur to us. It is neither a risk-taking behaviour nor a personal run-up. It is the
pre-reflective background of our beliefs and actions, and it can do without any reason.
96 On  the  whole,  Reid’s  ethics  of  belief  may  help  escape  the  contemporary stalemate
between evidentialism and pragmatism.  Far  from simply  dismissing  the  evidentialist
demand, it combines a subtle evidentialism with pragmatist strands. What is more, Reid’s
view is in some sense more permissive than the evidentialist’s (because it allows beliefs to
be justified, even though we don’t have access to a specific evidence that grounds them),
while being less permissive than the pragmatist’s (because it allows some cases29 that
James is interested in, while showing that they have undiscerned evidence behind them
after all). This middle way is made possible because Reid abandons the internalist aspect
of the evidentialist demand, whereas James still  ties evidentialism to internalism and
considers that practical reasons meet the internalist requirement. This is on this score
that  pragmatism  may  learn  from  common  sense:  Reid’s  common  sense  teaches  the
externalist lesson.
97 If  pragmatism is currently held to “cast valuable light on the philosophy of common
sense”30 (ridding it of its dogmatic flavour), I conclude the other way around: the Reidian
epistemology  of  common  sense,  while  compatible  with  pragmatism,  gets  round  the
danger of a loose ethics of belief. Epistemic permissivism does not open the floodgates to
subjective and idiosyncratic beliefs. 
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NOTES
1. (10 September 1903) Perry (1935: 501).
2. P, 1, p. 18 (P = Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking).
3. EIP, 6, 4, p. 464 (EIP = Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man).
4. Epistemic principles (“first principles of truth”) state the good-working laws of our intellectual
powers. We find for instance the principle of perception (“those things do really exist which we
distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be,” EIP, 6, 5, p. 476), the
principle of reliability (“the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error, are not
fallacious,” EIP, 6, 5, p. 480), the principles of veracity and credulity (men have “a propensity to
speak truth” and “a disposition to confide in the veracity of others,” IHM, 6, 24, p. 193-4 [IHM =
An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense]).
5. The most famous contemporary defence of evidentialism is in Conee & Feldman 2000.
6. WB, p. 19, p. 22. WB = The Will To Believe.
7. See Leary 2016. For a defence of evidentialism construed as implying alethism, see Shah 2006.
For a criticism of this brand of evidentialism, see Rinard 2015, Leary 2016: they defend the view
according to which practical reasons may be genuine reasons to believe that p. In the following, I
take pragmatism to be a thesis on the nature of our reasons to believe. Briefly, it is the view
according to which purely pragmatic considerations can constitute genuine reasons to believe.
We are not constrained to evidential or epistemic reasons.
8. SPP, p. 229. (SPP = Some Problems of Philosophy [Appendix: Faith and the Right to Believe]).
9. Immediate beliefs are beliefs which are not grounded on antecedent belief or reasoning. They
include epistemic principles (like “my sense perception is reliable”) and corresponding natural
judgments  (the  immediate  doxastic  outputs  of  consciousness,  memory  and  perception,  like
“There is a table in front of me”).
10. See Kelly 2014.
11. The terminology is from Chignell 2016.
12. Reid’s  distinction  may  be  compared  to  Wittgenstein’s  warning  not  to  consider  all  the
propositions  in  a  uniform  way.  In  On  Certainty (=  OC),  Wittgenstein  distinguishes  hinge
propositions which constitute our “picture of the world against which [we] distinguish between
true  and false”  (OC,  §94),  from empirical  propositions  which may be  tested  or  refuted.  It  is
senseless  to  ask  for  a  reason  to  believe  the  first.  Hinge  propositions  are  like  “hardened
propositions”  which  function  “as  channels  for  empirical  propositions”  (OC,  §96).  This
background makes possible the evidentialist quest of reasons, but it is itself taken away from
such a quest.
13. According to Lundestadt (2006: 135) Reid sticks to infallibilism, and therefore his philosophy
is unpragmatic. Sackson (2014: §§36-42) contests this point: Reid hopes that men will come to
unanimity about first principles, although it is probable that there will always be disagreements.
Rysiew (2015: 190) recognises a fallibilist strand in Reid’s philosophy: Reid is ready to admit that
what we are strongly inclined to believe may be false. Thus Putnam is wrong to consider that
“the unique insight of American pragmatism” is perhaps that “one can be both fallibilistic and
antiskeptical.” Reid saw that too! According to Baumann (1999; 54), the more Reid’s theory of
common  sense  is  compatible  with  fallibilism,  the  more  it  escapes  the  dilemma  between
dogmatism and scepticism.
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14. Reid alludes to this in EIP, 6, 4, p. 460-1: when the truth of first principles is the object of a
controversy, it “labours under a peculiar disadvantage.” For if we want to test the tester, we need
another tester. The test consists in showing the connexion or repugnancy of a proposition with
first principles.
15. Of course, James’s talk of beliefs of common sense as ways of thinking which are “discoveries
of  exceedingly remote ancestors” (P,  5,  p. 170)  can seem at  odds with Reid’s  taking the first
principles  as  part  of  the  human constitution.  But  we should not  take James too literally.  In
accordance with his openness to the evolutionary thought, such “discoveries” are better thought
as “fortuitous adaptations,” so that they are as much part of the human constitution for James as
they are for Reid.
16. EAP, 3, 1, 2, p. 110-1 (EAP = Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind).
17. SR, p. 63-4 (SR = The Sentiment of Rationality)
18. Truth is “what would be better for us to believe” (“It comes very near to saying ‘what we
ought to believe’”), P, 2, p. 77.
19. See White (2005: 445) for a presentation and a defence of Uniqueness.
20. For a criticism of Uniqueness and a defence of a permissivist ethics of belief, see Kelly 2014.
Kelly presents permissivism as the view according to which there are cases where there may be
some “slack”  between the  available  evidence  and what  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  given the
evidence. In other words, our rational beliefs may exceed what the evidentialist rule allows. 
21. James’s example: “Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain…” (SR, p. 96).
22. As a matter of fact, there is no settled opinion on Jame’s position in The Will to Believe. For a
view  which  attributes  practical  non-evidentialism  to  James  (and  criticises  it  in  the  name  of
evidentialism),  see  Aikin  2014.  For  a  view  which  shows  the  import  of  Jame’s  essay  to
contemporary epistemological issues (contextualism, conservatism and virtue epistemology), see
Hookway 2011.
23. “It is evident, that every argument offered to prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties,
takes for granted the things in question, and is therefore that kind of sophism which Logicians
call petitio principii” (EIP, 7, 4, p. 571).
24. See Baumann (2004: 75).
25. According to Rysiew (2015: 189), Reid’s point is that the fact that epistemic principles play a
central  role  in  our  epistemic  lives  amounts  to  a  kind  of  epistemic  justification.  Practical
considerations are not “entirely cut off from epistemic ones.” Their epistemic justification lies in
what they enable us to do as epistemic agents. They are like the “fixed point” upon which our
cognising rests (EIP, 6, 4, p. 454). 
26. Internalism may also refer to an ontological theory about the nature of evidence, according
to  which  evidence  is  a  mental  state.  One  may  accept  the  epistemological  theory  without
subscribing  to  the  ontological  theory  (though  it  seems  easier  to  have  access  to  evidence  if
evidence is a mental state – a belief, a sensation, etc. – that can be apprehended. For Reid, the
different  forms of  evidence  cannot  be  reduced to  “any  common nature”  (EIP,  2,  20,  p. 229).
Consequently, evidence may be internal or external to our mind: it may be some propositions,
states of consciousness, sensations, memories, somebody’s saying, or facts of the external world.
If the sort of thing which is evidence is not necessarily mental, it gives support to the idea that
evidence – though present – is not necessarily something one is aware of.
27. Van Woudenberg (2013: 83).
28. I also think that if common-sense epistemology is in tune with permissivism, it is due to its
particularist  twist.  Briefly,  particularism is  a thesis about the aim we pursue in epistemology.
According to it, we don’t start with epistemic norms and go on to measure the extent of our
knowledge, but we start with what we know, that is to say with particular judgments we take as
instances of knowledge, and then we formulate criteria of knowledge. I guess that the adoption
of this methodological  starting point paves the way for permissivism. Indeed, common-sense
A Permissivist Ethics of Belief
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
22
philosophers (like Reid,  Moore in “Proof of an External World”) take their certainty of some
particular judgments as that from which they evaluate the plausibility or the absurdity of a thesis
or philosophical argument. And as they take many natural empirical judgments as well-grounded
independently of  considering whether they have sufficient epistemic evidence for them, this
very  fact  discredits  the  strong  evidentialist  requirement.  On  this  aspect  of  common-sense
philosophy, see Lemos (2004, chap. 1 and chap. 6).
29. Probably not all  the cases that  James is  interested in (like specific  moral  and existential
beliefs), but at least many ordinary empirical beliefs. 
30. Lundestadt (2008: 175).
ABSTRACTS
We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there
are  many  beliefs  which  are  deprived  of  adequate  epistemic  evidence.  In  such  cases,  James
recommends the “subjective method” which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This
pragmatist  move  is  rejected  by  evidentialists  who  think  that  beliefs  must  be  grounded  on
adequate epistemic evidence. My contention is that Reid’s approach to irresistible beliefs we do
not hold for epistemic reasons offers a persuasive means to escape the contemporary stalemate
between evidentialism and pragmatism. Are we rational in holding beliefs for which we don’t
possess sufficient epistemic evidence?
Reid and James subscribe to a permissivist ethics of belief, according to which we are allowed to
hold a belief even if we cannot show its epistemic credentials. Yet I show that the abandonment
of  the  stringent  evidentialist  requirement  (which  is  tied to  a  form of  internalism)  does  not
necessarily commit one to a pure form of pragmatism (which offers practical reasons instead of
epistemic ones). If Reid proposes arguments built on a pragmatist line, he does not reject the
evidentialist demand per se, only its internalist form. Moreover, in his view, immediate beliefs are
carried by a kind of instinctive epistemic trust. On the whole, pragmatism and common sense do
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